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There is but little doubt about the existence of the idea of a peculiar historically 
based physiognomy of contemporary Iranian culture and society in comparison 
with other regions and peoples of the Islamic Near and Middle East. The 
consciousness of such traditional and typically Iranian elements certainly nour-
ished and still nourishes the emergence of various aspects of national identity in 
the sense of modern nationalist ideological thought among the Iranian intelli-
gentsia of our century. 
According to nationalist imaginations and concepts, these peculiarities in 
Iranian cultural history are most commonly traced back to Sasanian, Achaeme-
nian and sometimes even more ancient origins, thus presenting a tableau of the 
modern Iranian nation as having existed continuously since early antiquity. 
There is even a respectable number of international Iranologists who might agree 
with such an almost legendary image of Iran and of Iranian culture. We all 
remember quite well the former Pahlavi regime's endeavours to present such an 
interpretation of Iranian history in connection with the celebrations of the 2500th 
anniversary of monarchy in Iran. 
However, closer examination of the social and sociocultural medieval and 
early modern history of the Iranian region offers, in some respects, a quite 
different explanation of these peculiarities compared with those of, e.g., Mamluk 
Egypt and Syria, and the territories having been gradually conquered by the 
Ottoman Empire. This seems to be related to the very special structure of Iranian 
society throughout the last six or seven centuries. 1 
The Mongol Domination and After 
The Mongol-or more precisely-the Chingizid invasion into Iran in the 13th 
century resulted in a disastrous blow against the physical existence of the 
majority of the Iranian population. In addition, the Mongol conquests caused a 
wave of immigration of non-Iranian, originally Central Asian horse-riding tribal 
elements, most of them being ethnically of Turkic origin. As far as their 
collective lifestyle is concerned, they differed clearly from the traditional tribes 
of the Iranian plateau between Kurdistan and the Hindukush ranges, especially 
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by their typically Central Asian traditions of horse-riding and pastoral 
nomadism, which is to be characterized mainly by long-distance mobility, a 
militant inclination to warfare and political power, and a peculiar system of tribal 
organization having been spread out all over the nomadic populace of the 
Central Asian steppe regions without regard to their ethnic or linguistic 
affiliations. 
After the breakdown of Mongol rule in Iran during the l 4th century the 
number of these mainly, but not exclusively, Turkic tribal and nomadic elements 
in Iran remained very high and even increased during the 15th century due to the 
Ottoman pressure against the Turkoman tribes of Anatolia (the Qara-Qoyunlu 
and the Aq-Qoyunlu tribal federations), thus having been forced to return to Iran 
at that time. As they had no further possibilities of remigration to Central Asia 
because they were stopped by the tribal rnilitary forces of Timur and his 
successors, and later on by those of the Uzbek khanates, they soon became a 
stable and constituent element of Iranian population and society. Concerning the 
early 19th century, the percentage of the tribal elements in comparison with the 
whole population of Iran was esteemed by some to be up to 50%. And as these 
tribal entities in Iran refrained from giving up their transhumant and militant 
lifestyle together with their typically Central Asian tribal organizational struc-
tures, they soon turned out not only to be monopolizing anything to do with 
military affairs, but almost exclusively to be the potential possessors of any type 
of political power in Iran. Thus, political power in Iran became based on 
traditionally tribal, instable coalitions and confederations as had been typical for 
Central Asian tribal politics. Therefore, the usually highly prized, centralized 
power and rulership (as represented by the Safavids in the 17th century) was in 
fact by no means typical for the sociopolitical history of premodern, post-Mon-
gol Iran. If we compare Iran to other regions in the Near and Middle East in the 
same time, the usufructuary social layers and classes in Iranian society were only 
at a first and very superficial glance represented by urban, bureaucratic and 
courtly elements. As seen in the long run, the main potential beneficiaries of the 
state's collecting taxes and tributes from the mainly agrarian producers, and, 
consequently, the real ruling social class in Iranian society, were the above-men-
tioned tribes, a fact corroborated by historical evidence up to the beginning of 
the 20th century.2 
According to the facts given above, since the period of Mongol domination, 
the Plateau of Iran has been hopelessly overcrowded by these tribes up until the 
end of the 19th century. To them, there might have existed various strategies in 
order to overcome this situation. One might have been the policy of elimination 
of the sedentary agrarian and urban population. This policy was exercised during 
the first decades of Chingizid rule, and again during the time of Timur. As the 
reforms of Ghäzän Khan (about 1300) and under Timur's successors corrobor-
ate, this strategy eventually proved to be disastrous, not only for the suppressed 
population but for the ruling classes too. Another possibility for collective 
reaction towards this situation might have been the permanent internal rivalry 
and fight for pasture-grounds in Iran among the various tribes themselves. 
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Repeated civil wars and destabilizing tribal fights give enough evidence for this 
concept having been practised in Iranian history during the last six or seven 
centuries. 
But there was still another strategy: by maintaining their monopoly of military 
affairs, the tribes became successful in establishing political power and 
rulership. As this type of rulership-in accordance with their Central Asian 
traditions-was mainly based on tribal confederations, political power in Iran 
turned out to be usually neither centralized nor stable. Therefore, the intermezzo 
of the later Safavids offers a rather untypical example of a centralized state in 
Iran. 
According to demographic considerations (high density of the tribal popu-
lation and likewise the limitation of pasture-grounds in Iran), it seems to be 
reasonable to assume that their traditionally tribal and cattle-breeding, nomadic 
lifestyle gradually lost its importance under the aspect of economy and produc-
tivity. But, on the other side, the maintenance of this lifestyle was a basic 
precondition for maintaining their military capacities. These military capacities 
of the tribes enabled their leaders to participate in the permanent struggle for 
political power. Therefore, tribal and nomadic life must have been perpetuated 
not primarily to cover any economic and productive needs but, above all, in 
order to ensure military training. Step by step, tribal life and customs acquired 
a striking aspect of a more or less simulated economy. Consequently, the 
originally Central Asian tribes became the main potential beneficiaries of the 
state' s means and tools of expropriation of the agrarian producers, and they 
remained in this usufructuary position in Iranian society up to the middle of the 
19th century. lt might be maintained that military affairs among the Mamluks 
and the Ottomans also formed a prerogative of ethnic elements of Turkic origin, 
but the crucial point is that they were not at all based on a tribal structure. In 
comparison with these areas, the sociopolitical structure of premodern Iran 
therefore belongs much more to a Central Asian pattern than to the Mediter-
ranean model of the Arab and Ottoman civilizations. 
Terminology and Semantics 
This basic socioeconomic feature of the social structure of the late medieval and 
premodern Iranian society greatly influenced what might be called the political 
culture in Iran during this period. Some had a direct inftuence on emerging 
political identity and self-consciousness of Iran and the Iranians. 
In this connection, the most striking example is the usage of the term 'Iran' 
in order to denominate a political concept of territory. As Gherardo Gnoli 
(Rome) has pointed out, already the early Sasanians had created a political 
conception of 'Iran' merely following ideological lines, its contents being in 
tight relation to Sasanian political rule. So we must not wonder about the fact 
that after the breakdown of the Sasanian Empire, in other words from early Islam 
throughout the whole period of the Abbasid Caliphate, the term 'Iran' had lost 
all its political connotations. In the proper sense of the denomination of a 
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political entity, the word 'Iran' had virtually disappeared during this period. 
Even the Great-Seljuqs refrained from denominating their territory by using the 
word 'Iran', irrespective of the fact that their territory resembled more or less the 
geographical extensions of the ancient Sasanian Empire. Actually it was up to 
the Mongol 11-Khans of the 13th century to realize the official reanimation of the 
political notion of 'Iran' in order to find an adequate denomination of their 
'ulus', their partial Chingizid khanate. They might have done this facing the fact 
that there was no possibility to give the name of any immediate son of Chingiz 
Khan to their territory as had been practised in the cases of the Golden Horde 
(the 'Ulus Juchi') and of Transoxania (the 'Ulus Chaghatay'), since the founder 
of the 11-Khanate, Hülägü, was not a son but only a grandson of Chingiz Khan. 
His brother Kubilai was in a similar situation when he decided to proclaim 
officially his ulus simply as 'China' and himself as the founder of the Chinese 
Yüan-dynasty.3 
Without any exceptions, all political concepts of 'Iran' dating from later 
periods up to contemporary times, were then derived directly from this Mongo-
lian notion. The Mongols' conception of Iran consisted, for instance, in the idea 
of Iran's capital being the city of Tabriz. Before the Il-Khanid rule, Tabriz never 
before in Iranian history had been in a similar position. This city, being located 
at the northwestem fringes of the country, was not at all suitable geographically 
as the capital of a state covering the greater parts of the highlands of Iran. But 
regardless of this fact, the idea of Tabriz being the undisputed and quasi natural 
capital of Iran survived at least up to the end of the 16th century. Whenever 
Turkoman (Qara-Qoyunlu and Aq-Qoyunlu) rulers succeeded in the conquest of 
Tabriz in the 15th century they used to proclaim themselves as 'padshah-e Iran' 
or 'kesrä-ye Iran' without any regard to the real extent of the territory being 
actually under their rule. Shäh Esmä' sil, the founder of the dynasty of Safavid 
rulers, happened to do quite the same in the year 1501. When then under his 
successor Tahmäsp, in the 16th century the capital was transferred from Tabriz 
to Qazvin, this was obviously conceived to be only a temporary measure, having 
been caused by the Ottomans' heavy military threat towards the province of 
Azerbayjan. Only at the beginning of the 17th century, when under 'Abbäs 1. 
Isfahan was finally established as the Safavids' capital, did the extremely 
impractical idea of Tabriz being the capital of Iran come definitively to an end. 
But Tabriz remained to be a privileged city in comparison with all other Iranian 
cities and towns, having been-for instance-the residence of the Iranian 
heir-apparent until the early 20th century. Up to modern times the city of Tabriz 
continued to bear the official title 'däro s-saltaneh', i.e., 'the location of 
rulership' .4 
Another aspect of the Mongols' conception of Iran as a political territory 
concems the northeastem frontier. Before the Mongol conquest there usually 
existed no clear borderlines conceived between the territories of Khoräsan, 
Transoxania and Khoräzm. Owing to the Mongols' territorial partition, these 
borders became clearly defined, in accordance with the fact that from that time 
onward Iran was-and still is--conceived as the territory of the former Mongo-
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lian II-Khanate, whereas the Transoxanian rulers (Timur and the Timurids, and 
after them the Uzbek khanates until the end of the 19th century) were the 
successors of the Mongol Ulus Chaghatay, with the exception of Khorazm 
(Khiva) which had belonged to the Golden Horde in Mongol times.5 
In this connection it is of high interest to us that as late as in the 19th century 
the Qajar rulers of Iran created a legitimizing but apocryphal myth of their own 
genealogical descendance from somebody belonging to the personal entourage of 
the Chingizid Hülägü Khan, the founder of the Mongol state of Iran. 
The development of the Iranian state chancery traditions and regulations 
throughout these six centuries accords perfectly with my thesis. When the 
Mongols reestablished a new administrative system under Ghäzän Khan about 
the year 1300, they adopted a wide range of chancery practices and uses 
originating in Chinese and Uighur bureaucratic traditions, and combined them 
with 'Abbäsid-so-called 'Islamic' -administrative practices. In later periods 
these Mongol inventions continuously were developed further until the 19th 
century, permanently and substantially disconnected from the chancery traditions 
of the Mamluks' and, above all, the Ottoman states. 6 
An even more striking example of the Mongols' impact on political culture in 
Iran is the development of taxation in Iran together with the specifically Iranian 
changes conceming the institutions of landholding. One must not forget that 
Islam had fallen definitively out of power as a normative juridic element in 
administration throughout the first 50 years of Mongol rule in Iran. After the 
rehabilitation of Islam in about the year 1300, the Islamic juridical regulations 
remained unaccepted in the question of taxation and grants of revenues (formerly 
called iqtä'ät). The major and most important taxes remained then to be of 
non-Islamic origin, having been prescribed by the Chingizid legal codex, the 
yasa, throughout the following centuries. To a certain extent, this development 
was clearly stopped by the Uzbek rulers in Transoxania after 1500. In Iran, 
however, this development was even enforced at the same time under the 
Safavids. The implementation of Twelver-Shiism as the official religion in Iran 
did by no means result in a kind of Re-Islamization of the taxation system as had 
happened in Transoxania in the same period. In Iran, the Safavids as well as their 
successors never tried to make superficial legitimization by or harmonization 
with Islamic juridic principles of their tax-system. This is also to be observed in 
accordance with the administrative concepts of landholding, at least to a certain 
extent. The institute of the so-called 'soyfirghäl' etymologically and substantially 
of Mongol origin, was a clear and outspoken offence to the Islamic concept of 
'ig:ä'', as the soyurghal was officially accepted to be hereditary and, moreover, 
to grant administrative and political rights as well to its owner. So we may 
witness in administrative history of post-Mongol Iran something like a partial 
premodem 'proto-secularization', widely incomparable to any other Islamic 
political entity within the period under discussion. This development was by no 
means due to any 'typically Iranian' hostile attitude towards Islam, 
as some Iranian nationalists might argue, but originated exclusively in the 
Mongols' non-Islamic administration policies.7 
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New Currency System Established 
Present-day's lranian currency shows an astonishing continuity, irrespective of a 
high degree of political discontinuity during the last seven centuries. Again due 
to Ghäzan Khän's reforms of the year 1300, at that time a new currency system 
was established, being no longer based on the traditional Islamic monetary 
system but rather in accordance with Chinese models. Thus, a silver coin named 
'dinär' was created as the basic currency unit, ten thousand dinars forming a 
unit of account named 'uman', derived from the Mongolian word tümän 
(meaning 10,000). In the course of waves of permanent depreciation, the 
standard silver coin had the nominal value of 1000 dinars at the beginning of our 
century and was called 'qerän', still based on Ghazan Khan' s monetary reforms 
dating back to the early 14th century. Tue present-day's lranian currency unit 
'riäl' is the direct successor of this 'qerän', the amount of 10 Rials still being 
called popularly 'tuman' ! 
Conclusions 
By means of these examples and illustrations I have tried to trace some 
historically important roots from which the political conception of lran's 
collective personality and special physiognomy gradually emerged. lt becomes 
clear that, in an anthropological view of history, Central Asian tribal elements, 
once having been implanted by the Mongol conquerors and rulers and having 
been largely represented by Turkic tribes from the 14th to the I 9th century, were 
in many respects responsible for what tumed out to be the political conception 
of 'Iran', as it is at present accepted. 
In opposition to the sociohistorical development of early modern Mediter-
ranean and Atlantic Europe, Hamid R. Kousha defined his concept of an 
'Ottoman-lranian Historical Block'. But as long as we consider primarily the 
internal societal and historical dynamics of this 'Block', we must rather accept 
a clearly separate structural position of Iran together with Afghanistan, Transox-
ania and, maybe, even Muslim India, belonging much more to a Central Asian 
entity than to a Mediterranean-Ottoman one. 9 
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